The problem of objectivity in legal interpretation. Between philosophical theory and legal practice

Abstract

The article investigates the problem of objectivity in legal interpretation. The analysis proceeds from the theory of legal interpretation established by Ronald Dworkin and examines the relationships between the categories of truth and objectivity in the context of legal reasoning, preceded by a discussion of the metaphysical status of the law in the two dominant notions of the Anglo-American tradition, legal realism and legal positivism. It then confronts Dworkin's notion of law as integrity with legal conventionalism and pragmatism, setting aside the reading that identifies interpretative practice with relativism: the pre-interpretative stage, tied to language and social context, is only the beginning of a process aimed at discovering the objective moral principles lying behind the codified rules. In the last step the analysis considers the practical consequences of the discussed matter for legal reasoning and for adjudication. It holds that interpretation is not reducible to the relativisation of rules but amounts to an attempt to identify the general moral convictions of society, so that the idea of legal interpretation is compatible with the assumption of the real and objective existence of the law.